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CORPORATE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST UNDER THE
VIRGINIA STOCK CORPORATION ACT
Stephen R. Larson*
Dealings between a corporation and its officers or directors present a perennial corporate law problem. Officers and directors are
often the people most interested in the success of the corporation
and they accordingly may well be willing to contract with their
corporation on terms far more favorable to it than are otherwise
available. On the other hand, these same people are often in a
position to cause the corporation to enter into contracts which are
highly advantageous to the officer or director involved, but which
are grossly unfair and detrimental to the corporation itself.'
Courts have employed a variety of methods to resolve the problem
of contracts between an officer or director and his corporation. Decisions prior to the turn of the century almost universally held such
contracts to be voidable at the option of the corporation. However,
virtually all states, including Virginia, have abandoned this Draconian approach in favor of a rule that a contract will be fully
enforceable if it is fair, if the interested officer or director has fully
disclosed his interest to the board of directors prior to the approval
of the contract and if he does not participate in its adoption.' Conversely, if the interested officer or director has failed to adequately
disclose his interest, the contract will be voidable at the instance of
the corporation without regard to whether its terms were fair to the
corporation or whether the corporation suffered any injury under it.'
*Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law, T.C. Williams School of Law; B.A., College of William & Mary, 1968; J.D., Columbia University, 1971.
1. For a general discussion of conflicts of interest, including a summary of attempts to deal
with such conflicts in various states, see Marsh, Dutiesand Liabilitiesof CorporateDirectors:
A Symposium, 22 Bus. LAw. 29 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Marsh].
2. Id. at 39-43; Kessler v. Commonwealth Doctors Hosp. Inc., 212 Va. 497, 185 S.E.2d 43
(1971); Rowland v. Kable, 174 Va. 343, 6 S.E.2d 633 (1940); Marcuse v. Broad-Grace Arcade
Corp., 164 Va. 553, 180 S.E. 327 (1935); Deford v. Ballentine Realty Corp., 164 Va. 436, 180
S.E. 164 (1935).
3. Rowland v. Kable, 174 Va. 343, 6 S.E.2d 633 (1940). See Avis, Inc. v. Charmatz, 208 F.
Supp. 932 (E.D. Mo. 1962), to the effect that law in Maine, Missouri and Massachusetts made
contracts with officers voidable without reference to fairness if his interest was not disclosed.
Defenses such as laches or estoppel may be available to the party attempting to uphold such
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In recent years many states have abandoned this traditional rule
for a less restrictive one based solely upon the fairness of the contract. Under this more relaxed rule, enforceability does not depend
on whether there has been prior disclosure of an adverse interest. 4
At its 1975 session, ,the Virginia General Assembly adopted a
statute designed to conform Virginia law relating to contracts between a corporation and its officers or directors to this more "liberal" rule. 5 It is part of a comprehensive revision of the Virginia
a contract. The application of these defenses, however, is beyond the scope of this article.
The availability to the corporation of civil remedies other than voidability of such a contract
is also beyond the scope of this article.
4. Marsh, supra note 1, at 43-44. This change has been accomplished by statute in several
states. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 820 (West 1955); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-30 (1965); N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 713 (McKinney 1963). In other states it has been accomplished by court
decisions. See, e.g., Shlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp., 19 Ill. 2d 268, 166 N.E.2d 793
(1960). An accurate count of the states currently ascribing to this rule is difficult to estimate
due to the lack of recent decisions in many states. Adoption of this rule appears to be another
manifestation of an overall trend in many states to reduce the fiduciary responsibility of
corporate management.
5. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-39.1 (effective June 1, 1975) provides:
(a) No contract or other transaction between a corporation and one or more of its
officers or directors or in which one or more of its officers or directors are interested
and no contract or other transaction between a corporation and any other corporation,
firm, association or entity in which one or more of its officers or directors are directors
or officers or are interested, shall be either void or voidable because of such relationship
or interest or because such director or directors are present at the meeting of the board
of directors or a committee thereof which authorizes, approves or ratifies such contract
or transaction or because his or their votes are counted for such purpose, provided that
the material facts as to his or their relationship or interest are disclosed or known:
(i) to the board of directors or committee which authorizes, approves or ratifies the
contract or transaction by a vote sufficient for the purpose without counting the votes
of such interested directors; or
(ii) to the stockholders entitled to vote and they authorize, approve or ratify such
contract or transaction by vote or written consent.
(b) In any event no contract or other transaction described in subsection (a) of this
section shall be void or voidable despite failure to comply with parts (i) or (ii) of
subsection (a), provided that such contract or transaction was fair and reasonable to
the corporation in view of all the facts known to any officer or director at the time such
contract or transaction was entered into on behalf of the corporation. In an action to
obtain relief for the corporation on account of a contract or other transaction described
in subsection (a) in which there was no compliance with parts (i) or (ii) of subsection
(a) such contract or transaction may be voided for the benefit of the corporation and
the court may grant other appropriate relief unless the party seeking to uphold the
contract of transaction sustains the burden of proving that such contract or transaction
complied with the requirement of the first sentence of this subsection (b).
The directors and officers of any public utility as defined in § 56-232 shall file in
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Stock Corporation Act' which goes into effect on June 1, 1975. The
statute will substantially alter the common law rule applicable in
Virginia to contracts involving conflicts of interest. It is not intended, however, to displace totally the former common law rule,
but only to amend it to the extent set forth in the statute.'
This article will explore the current state of the law in Virginia
relating to contracts between a corporation and its officers and
directors, and will focus particularly on the impact which the newly
enacted legislation will have upon that law. Along the way, it will
point out some ambiguities and potentially troublesome questions
which remain unanswered under the new statute.
I.

CORPORATE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST UNDER THE COMMON LAW IN

VIRGINIA

Under existing Virginia case law it is possible for an officer or
director of a corporation to enter into a binding contract with that
corporation if (i) the officer or director discloses the nature of his
the State Corporation Commission a record of all offices and directorships and all
sources of income in excess of twenty-five thousand dollars per year, arising from
voting securities in all other corporations, which to the knowledge of the director or
officer furnishes fuel with a value in excess of fifty thousand dollars per year to the
public utility. Such records for the past year shall be filed or made current on or before
September first of each year.
6. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 500. This revision of the Virginia Stock Corporation Act
was initially drafted by Richard K. Joynt of Richmond, Virginia. This draft of the revision
was introduced in the 1973 Virginia General Assembly as H.B. No. 1151, but enactment was
delayed in order to provide an opportunity for comment upon the proposed legislation. The
Business Law section of the Virginia State Bar, under the chairmanship of Charles D. Fox,
I, thereafter employed Professors Michael T. Dooley and J.A.C. Hetherington of the law
faculty of the University of Virginia to review the proposed legislation. Their written report,
Dooley and Hetherington, Comments on Proposed Amendments to the Virginia Stock
Corporation Act, Nov. 15, 1973 [hereinafter cited as Comments on Proposed Amendments],
was presented at a meeting of interested members of the Business Law Section held December
20, 1973 in Charlottesville, Virginia. As a result of the Comments on Proposed Amendments
and this meeting, proposed Section 13.1-39.1 was revised by Mr. Joynt and Professors Dooley
and Hetherington in several material respects. The proposed revision was re-introduced in
the 1974 session of the Virginia General Assembly as H.B. 872, and was carried over to the
1975 session. It was enacted without change from the form introduced in the 1974 session,
except for the final paragraph, which was adopted as a last minute amendment and does not
relate to the substance of the remainder of the section. This final paragraph will not be
discussed in this article.
7. See Address by Prof. Hetherington, Virginia State Bar Annual Meeting, June 22, 1974;
ALI-ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d § 41, comment (1969).
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interest, (ii) the corporation is adequately represented by other

agents, and (iii) the contract is fair to the corporation at the time it
is made. If any of these criteria are not met the contract is voidable
at the option of the corporation whether or -not it has been harmed
by the contract . Each of these criteria will be examined more
closely below.
In Virginia, a contract in which a director has an interest is enforceable at common law only if there has been adequate disclosure
of that interest to the other directors. This requirement is closely
related to the requirement that the corporation be represented by
independent agents. The function of such disclosure is to alert the
remaining directors that the interested director will not be acting
solely on behalf of the corporation. It appears that the required
disclosure must include information relating not only to the nature
of the conflict of interest, but also to the merits of the contract,'"
although this latter type of disclosure may arise simply from the
duty of every director to reveal material information concerning
corporate matters rather than from the director's conflict of interest."
In order for the corporation to be adequately represented by other
agents, the cases require that there be a sufficient number of disinterested directors to constitute a quorum of the board at the meeting
8. See note 2 supra.A contract in which an officer or director has an interest will sometimes
be voidable on grounds independent of the conflict itself. The most likely independent ground
would be fraud arising from a failure to disclose adverse information concerning the transaction. See 12 WMLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1533 at 679-80 (3d ed. 1970). Failure of any officer or
director to disclose information, however, will not necessarily constitute fraud justifying
avoidance of the contract. For example, the materiality of the information withheld and the
rights of innocent third parties must be considered, particularly where such third parties were
unaware of the conflict of interest or had not authorized the party having a conflict to act on
their behalf. Another potential ground for avoiding such a contract is undue influence on the
corporation by the officer or director having the conflict of interest.
9. Rowland v. Kable, 174 Va. 343, 6 S.E.2d 633 (1940); Marcuse v. Broad-Grace Arcade
Corp., 164 Va. 553, 180 S.E. 327 (1935); Deford v. Ballentine Realty Corp., 164 Va. 436, 180
S.E. 164 (1935).
10. Deford v. Ballentine Realty Corp., 164 Va. 436, 180 S.E. 164 (1935).
11. The duty of a director to disclose information relating to the merits of a contract
becomes especially important if that director has a conflict of interest because of the likelihood of his having greater access to adverse information and because of a greater reluctance
on his part to disclose such adverse information. This common law duty may require greater
amplification by the courts in light of the new Virginia statute on conflicts of interest, which
refers only to disclosures relating to the conflict itself. See text accompanying note 42 infra.
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approving the contract and, further, that the contract be adopted
by the majority vote of those disinterested directors.12 An interested
director cannot be counted in determining the presence of a quorum, and without a quorum the board of directors lacks authority
to bind the corporation.13 If the board lacks a sufficient number of
disinterested directors to constitute a quorum, or if a contract is
adopted through the affirmative votes of one or more of the directors
who should have been disqualified from acting due to a conflict of
interest, the stockholders have the power to ratify the irregular actions of the board and make the contract enforceable against the
corporation. 4 Ratification will be binding only if the stockholders
are fully apprised of all the facts, including the nature of the conflict
of interest of the interested director. 15
It is unclear whether a director who is also a stockholder is prohibited from voting as a stockholder to ratify a contract in which he has
a personal interest. Some authorities indicate that ratification
under those circumstances would be ineffective. 6 A more meaningful and appropriate analysis is to determine whether a stockholder
who acts as a stockholder will violate any duty to the corporation
by voting on a matter in which he is personally interested, regardless
of whether he is also a director. Certainly a contract should be
subjected to the closest scrutiny if the same people that have a
personal interest in its adoption have both originally authorized the
contract as directors and then ratified it as stockholders.
Normally a stockholder is free to vote in his own best interest and
there appears to be no reason to deprive a stockholder of this right
simply because he also happens to be a director. A dominant or
12. Crump v. Bronson, 168 Va. 527, 191 S.E. 663 (1937); Marcuse v. Broad-Grace Arcade
Corp., 164 Va. 553, 180 S.E. 327 (1935); 2 W. FLEnCHR, PRiVATE CORPoRATIoNs § 426 (1969

rev. vol.) [hereinafter cited as FLrcHER].
13. Crump v. Bronson, 168 Va. 527, 191 S.E. 663 (1937); Marcuse v. Broad-Grace Arcade
Corp., 164 Va. 553, 180 S.E. 327 (1935); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-39 (Repl. Vol. 1973); 2
FLxrCHER, supra note 12, §§ 419, 426.
14. Koch v. Seventh St. Realty Corp., 205 Va. 65, 135 S.E.2d 131 (1964); Addison v. Lewis,
75 Va. 701, 721 (1881).
15. See cases cited note 14 supra.
16. See generally Folk, Conflicts of Interest underState Law, THim ANNuAL INsrrTuTE ON
SEcutrrms REGULATIONS, 179, 181 (A. Fleischer & R. Mundheim, ed. P.L.I. 1972).
17. 3 FLsrcHER, supra note 12, § 983; Northwest Trans. Co. v. Beatty, 12 App. Cas. 589
(P.C. 1887). See Marsh, supranote 1, at 49, to the effect that in many jurisdictions interested
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controlling stockholder, on the other hand, has a fiduciary duty to
act fairly toward the corporation and minority stockholders.' 8 This
by itself should restrict his freedom in voting upon a contract in
which he has an interest, even if he has refrained from placing
himself on the board of directors. The net result is that a dominant
or controlling stockholder probably will be allowed to vote on the
ratification of a contract in which he has an interest, but that ratification will be ineffective if the contract is unfair or oppressive to the
corporation. 9
A type of corporate conflict closely related to the problem of
stockholder ratification involves contracts in which a non-director
controlling stockholder of the corporation has an interest. This is a
very troublesome area. It differs from ratification in that a stockholder cannot act for the corporation and therefore is not in a position in which he can directly cause the corporation to enter into a
contract.20 If the board of directors is itself disinterested there will
be no need for ratification. Nevertheless, it will normally be difficult
to say that such a contract was formulated on an arms length basis.
The solution adopted by the Virginia Supreme Court is to treat a
director, if he can be shown to be representing a controlling stockholder rather than the best interests of the corporation, as having a
conflict of interest. 21 A contract adopted by the vote of one or more
such "dummy" directors will then be voidable due to the lack of
disinterested directors, rather than because of an interest of the
corporation's controlling stockholder.
Regardless of the mechanical process used to adopt a contract in
which a director is interested, that contract is voidable at common
law if it is unfair to the corporation. This is true even if a disinterested majority of the directors has voted for the contract after full
directors may vote as stockholders to ratify contracts.
18. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Mardel Sec., Inc. v. Alexandria Gazette Corp.,
320 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1963) (applying Virginia law).
19. This results from a violation of the fiduciary duty owed the corporation as a controlling
stockholder, not as a director.
20. The management of a corporation is vested by statute in the board of directors, and,
while stockholders have the power in certain instances to affirm contracts, they lack the power
to adopt a contract initially. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-35 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
21. Mardel Sec., Inc. v. Alexander Gazette Corp., 320 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1963) (applying
Virginia law); Marcuse v. Broad-Grace Arcade Corp., 164 Va. 553, 180 S.E. 327 (1935), citing
with approval, In re Webster Loose Leaf Filing Co., 240 F. 779 (D.N.J. 1916).
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disclosure of the interest of the interested directors.

2

The basis for

,this rule is that the director cannot truly put himself in the status
of an unrelated third party because he will continue to have the
trust and good will of the rest of the board.23 In fact, the board of
directors may well be less critical of a contract in which a fellow
director is interested than of contracts generally, either because of
a reluctance to deal harshly with an associate or because of an
inherent trust of a person who normally has the interests of the
2
corporation in mind.

1

In the event that the corporation wishes to avoid a contract on the
grounds that it is unfair, the courts have placed the burden of proving the fairness of the contract upon the officer or director who is
trying to uphold it, since he is a fiduciary and should be held strictly
accountable. 25 This seems particularly appropriate, since it is unlikely that the board which adopted a contract would seek to avoid
it and therefore, the plaintiff is usually a trustee in bankruptcy or
a minority stockholder bringing a derivative action. In either case,
the interested director will normally have greater access to the rele2
vant proof.
The Virginia cases on conflict of interest have dealt only with
directors or with officers who were also directors. The language used,
however, is sufficiently broad to encompass a non-director officer,
and the same rules appear to be applicable to either group.27 Certainly if an interested officer has taken part in negotiating a contract it should be voidable, because the corporation may well have
been deprived of the best bargain it could have obtained. Similar
considerations apply if the interested officer attempts to influence
the board of directors, at least in the absence of disclosure of the
officer's interest. If, on the other hand, the interested officer has had
22. Deford v. Ballentine Realty Corp., 164 Va. 436, 180 S.E. 164 (1935); 3 FLETCHER, supra
note 12, § 919.
23. Deford v. Ballentine Realty Corp., 164 Va. 436, 448, 180 S.E. 164, 169 (1935).
24. See Comments on Proposed Amendments, supra note 6, at 39.1-1, -2.
25. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Mardel Sec., Inc. v. Alexandria Gazette Corp.,
320 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1963); 3 F LCHER, supra note 12, § 921.
26. See Marsh, supra note 1, at 55-56, as to the'usual procedural posture of such cases.
27. See Kessler v. Commonwealth Doctors Hosp., Inc., 212 Va. 497, 185 S.E.2d 43 (1971);
Deford v. Ballentine Realty Corp., 164 Va. 436, 180 S.E. 164 (1935). But cf. BALLENTIa ON
CORPOATrONS § 123 (1927), suggesting that other rules may apply to officers.
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no influence on the terms of the contract or on its adoption, there
may be no potential harm to the corporation despite a failure to
disclose the interest of that officer. Nevertheless, it is not always
possible to accurately determine after the fact the role which a
particular officer may have played in the adoption of a contract.
Also, the subtle influences which an officer may exert upon his
fellow officers or the directors may be difficult for the interested
officer to avoid, or for the disinterested officers and directors to
detect, without prior disclosure that a conflict exists. In addition, a
corporation generally relies upon each of its officers to do his best
to negotiate a contract or to find alternative contracts. Such considerations may well justify a prophylactic rule rendering such a contract voidable, at least in the event that the contract is determined
to have been unfair to the corporation.
II.

THE VIRGINIA

STATUTE ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

The 1975 General Assembly enacted Virginia Code § 13.1-39.1,
relating to contracts in which an officer or director of a corporation
has an interest adverse to that of the corporation. 2 The statute is
modeled on § 41 of the Model Business Corporation Act, 9 which is,
in turn, similar in both form and substance to statutory provisions
adopted in California and several other states, although substantial
differences do exist among § 13.1-39.1, the Model Corporation Act
and the various other state provisions."
Under this new statute, a contract in which an officer or director
has an adverse interest will not be voidable due to the existence of
that conflict if (1) after adequate disclosure of the conflict to the
board of directors, it is nevertheless approved without counting the
votes of any interested directors, or (2) after adequate disclosure of
the conflict to the stockholders, they nevertheless appprove it, or (3)
whether or not any disclosure has been made, the contract appears
fair and reasonable to the corporation at the time it is approved
based upon all of the facts then known by any officer or director.
28. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-39.1 (effective June 1, 1975); Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 500,
at 17. The full text of section 13.1-39.1 is set out at note 5, supra.
29. ALI-ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr. ANN. 2d § 41 (1969).
30. Compare ALI-ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. 2d § 41 (1969) with CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 820 (West 1955), N.Y. Bus. CornP. LAW § 713 (McKinney 1963), S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-18.16
(Cum. Supp. 1974) and VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-39.1 (effective June 1, 1975).
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A.

Scope of Virginia Code § 13.1-39.1

Virginia Code § 13.1-39.1 deals with the voidability of contracts
purely on the grounds that an officer or director has an adverse
interest in that contract. Its purpose is only to eliminate certain
common law rules relating to voting by directors or officers having
a personal interest in a transaction.31 It in no way negates any remedies which a corporation may have against an officer or director
resulting from his failure to perform his duties to the corporation in
connection with such a contract, or with the avoidance on other
grounds of a contract in which an officer or director happens to have
an interest. These are matters which will continue to be left to the
courts for determination under general equitable principles. 32 Nor
does the statute deal with the voidability of contracts in which a
stockholder, including a controlling stockholder, may have an interest.3 3 It is broader than many statutes relating to conflicts of interest, however, in that it applies to conflicts of officers as well as those
of directors.3 4 The statute does not speak directly to the problem of
a director who has no personal interest in a contract but who merely
sits as a representative of another person who does have an interest.3 5 Presumably the common law rule still applies that a director
is considered to be an interested director if he is "dominated" by
or
3
acting on behalf of a person having an interest in the contract. 1
The statute applies to a wide varity of conflicts which could potentially disqualify a director's or officer's vote. The Model Corporation Act and the statutes of many states refer only to contracts or
other transactions in which a director has a financial interest.37 This
31. ALI-ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. 2d § 41, Comment (1969).
32. Id.; Address by Prof. Hetherington, Virginia State Bar Annual Meeting, June 22, 1974.
33. ALI-ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. 2d § 41, Comment (1969); Address by Prof.
Hetherington, Virginia State Bar Annual Meeting, June 22, 1974; Hetherington, Proposed
Amendments to the Virginia Stock CorporationLaw, 4 Bus. LAW SEc. NEWSLEIrER No. 1, at
2 (October, 1974). See text accompanying notes 18-21 supra for discussion of law relating to
conflicts of interest of controlling stockholders.
34. Comments on Proposed Amendments, supra note 6, at 39.1-1.
35. Address by Prof. Hetherington, Virginia State Bar Annual Meeting, June 22, 1974;
letter from Prof. Hetherington to A.C. Epps, Jr., March 1, 1974.
36. See note 21 supra and accompanying text; Efron v. Kalmanovitz, 226 Cal. App. 2d 546,
38 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1964).
37. See, e.g., ALI-ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. 2d § 41 (1969); CAL. COR. CODE § 820
(West 1955); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 713 (McKinney 1963).
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limitation to financial interests was reflected in an early draft of the
Virginia statute. 8 It was amended to its present form to expand the
statute's coverage to any type of interest which would cause a division of the director's loyalty, including, for example, a contract in
which a relative of a director has a direct interest.39 It also covers
indirect interests of officers and directors, such as contracts with
other corporations of which they are also directors or officers.
B.

Contracts Subject to Affirmance Under Virginia Code § 13.139.1(a)

Subsection (a) of the statute" provides that a contract will no
longer be automatically voidable due to the fact that the vote of one
or more interested directors is counted for its adoption. To the extent that this language validates the vote of an interested director,
it constitutes a major break with the common law in Virginia. To
illustrate this point, assume a situation involving a five man board
of directors, two of whom have personal interests in a contract to
be voted upon. Assume further that the two interested directors and
one disinterested director vote in favor of the contract while the
other two disinterested directors vote against it. At common law the
contract would have been rejected, having been defeated by a two
to one vote of the disinterested directors." Under this statute, however, it would be adopted by the board by a three to two vote and,
38. H.B. No. 1151 (1973).
39. Comments on Proposed Amendments, supra note 6, at 39.1-1.
40. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-39.1(a) (effective June 1, 1975) provides:
(a) No contract or other transaction between a corporation and one or more of its
officers or directors or in which one or more of its officers or directors are interested
and no contract or other transaction between a corporation and any other corporation,
firm, association or entity in which one or more of its officers or directors are directors
or officers or are interested, shall be either void or voidable because of such relationship or interest or because such director or directors are present at the meeting of the
board of directors or a committee thereof which authorizes, approves or ratifies such
contract or transaction or because his or their votes are counted for such purpose,
provided that the material facts as to his or their relationship or interest are disclosed
or known:
(i) to the board of directors or committee which authorizes, approves or ratifies the
contract or transaction by a vote sufficient for the purpose without counting the votes
of such interested directors; or
(ii) to the stockholders entitled to vote and they authorize, approve or ratify such
contract or transaction by vote or written consent.
41. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
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if one of the tests for enforceability set forth in the statute is met,
it would not be subject to later avoidance by the corporation.
In order for a contract to be approved under either parts (i) or (ii)
of subsection (a), an interested director must disclose "the material
facts as to his . . .relationship or interest"4 to the directors or
stockholders, respectively. This is broader than the requirement in
the Model Act and earlier drafts of the Virginia statute, which
would have required disclosure only of the fact that a conflict of
interest existed, but not of the material facts related to the nature
of that interest. 3 The disclosure called for by the statute, however,
still does not require an interested director to supply information
relating to the merits of the cntract." Presumably the duty to
supply this additional information continues under the general duty5
4
of every director to supply relevant information to the corporation.
A board of directors is not qualified to take any action unless a
quorum of directors is present. 6 The statute does not state whether
an interested director may be counted in determining the presence
of a quorum. Presumably the common law rule that the interested
director cannot be counted in determining the presence of a quorum
still controls,4 7 since statutes in derogation of the common law
should be strictly construed. This view is bolstered by a comparison
of the new statute with the Model Corporation Act and with earlier
drafts of the Virginia statute. Both of these sources include specific
authorization for counting interested directors to determine the
presence of a quorum; that authorization, however, was deleted in
the final draft of the Virginia statute. If a contract is approved at
a board meeting at which an interested director was needed to con42. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-39.1(a) (effective June 1, 1975).
43. H.B. No. 1151 (1973); ALI-ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr ANN. 2d § 41 (1969). The
inadequacy of this coverage was pointed out in Comments on Proposed Amendments, supra
note 6, at 39.1-5.
44. See Comments on Proposed Amendments, supra note 6, at 39.1-5, -6, which urged the
inclusion of the following language in section 13.1-39.1(a):
The material facts as to his relationship or interest and as to the contract or transaction
are disclosed . ...
45. See note 11 supra.
46. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-39 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
47. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
48. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-39.1 (effective June 1, 1975) with ALI-ABA MODEL Bus.
Corn. Acr ANN. 2d § 41 (1969) and H.B. No. 1151 (1973).
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stitute a quorum, that contract will be voidable, not because he was
there or voted, but because it was approved at a meeting which
lacked a quorum.49 Accordingly, such a contract cannot be validated
pursuant to § 13.1-39.1, which does not relate to the enforceability
of contracts which are voidable because adopted at an improperly
constituted meeting.
C.

Contracts Approved by DisinterestedDirectors
The first statutory test for validating a contract in which officers
or directors have an interest is contained in part (i) of § 13.1-39.1(a).
This provides that such a contract will not be voidable due to that
interest if, after adequate disclosure, it is adopted or ratified "by a
vote sufficient for the purpose without counting the vote of such
interested directors."5 Action by the board of directors requires the
favorable vote of a majority of the directors present at a meeting at
which a quorum is present.5 1 A vote "sufficient for the purpose,"
therefore, would require the vote of that number of disinterested
directors sufficient to constitute a majority of the total number of
directors present, including interested directors. In determing
whether the contract had been validated pursuant to part (i) of
subsection (a), the votes of interested directors would in effect be
treated the same as negative votes, and a greater number of favorable disinterested votes would be needed than if the interested directors had not been present. This is not to say that a contract adopted
by a majority of the total number of directors present, but not a
majority of the disinterested directors, would not have been validly
adopted. Nor would it necessarily be voidable. In order for it not to
be voidable it must merely meet one of the other statutory tests.
D. Contracts Approved by Stockholders
Part (ii) of subsection (a) validates a contract in which an officer
or director has an interest if, after disclosure, the stockholders au49. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
50. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-39.1(a)(i) (effective June 1, 1975).
51. Id. § 13.1-39 (Repl. Vol. 1973). See Comments on Proposed Amendments, supra note
6, at 39.1-1 (discussing rejection of a rule allowing approval by disinterested directors constituting less than majority of board members present); Rapoport v. Schneider, 29 N.Y.2d 396,
278 N.E.2d 642, 328 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1972) (implying necessity of disinterested quorum in
absence of specific statutory authority).
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thorize, approve or ratify the contract. Stockholder ratification is
generally necessary in situations in which the directors lack the
authority to bind the corporation." At common law, actions of the
board of directors which were otherwise subject to avoidance could
be ratified and made the binding act of the corporation if knowingly
approved by the stockholders.53 The procedure set forth in part (ii)
of subsection (a) of the statute is largely a statutory recognition and
refinement of the common law concept of ratification. 4
The statute clearly allows a stockholder having an interest in a
contract to vote for its ratification, even if he was the officer or
director whose conflict of interest had caused the approval of the
stockholders to be necessary. 5 The language of part (ii) of subsection (a) referring to the vote of all "stockholders entitled to vote"
contrasts sharply with the language of part (i), which specifically
excludes the "votes of . . . interested directors"." The language
relating to stockholders "entitled to vote" parallels the statutory
language which accords the right to vote to each outstanding share
of stock.5
The statute does not require resort first to part (i) to uphold a
contract in which a director has an interest, with recourse to subsection (ii) only if an insufficient number of disinterested directors had
been present at the board meeting to make compliance with subsection (i) possible. The desirability of such a result is questionable.
The board of directors is charged with the duty of managing the
corporation, and recourse should be had to the stockholders only
52. 2 FLwTCHE, supra note 12, § 429.
53. Id. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
54. Section 13.1-39.1(a)(ii) is not an affirmative grant of authority to stockholders to adopt
contracts. See note 20 supra and accompanying text as to the lack of such power. See also
Kennerson v. Burbank Amusement Co., 120 Cal. App. 2d 157, 260 P.2d 823 (1953); Lewis v.
Steinhart, 40 App. Div. 2d 817, 338 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1972); ALI-ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. Aar
ANN. 2d, § 41, Comment (1969).
55. See text accompanying notes 18-21 supra for common law rules relating to ratification
by stockholders.
56. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-39.1(a)(i), (ii) (effective June 1, 1975). N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§713(a)(2), now in substance identical to VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-39.1(a)(ii) (effective June 1,
1975), was amended specifically to authorize interested stockholders to vote. N.Y. LAws 1962,
ch. 834, § 52 (1963).
57. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-32 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
58. See text accompanying notes 46-49 supra for discussion of contracts adopted at a
meeting at which an interested director was necessary to make a quorum.
59. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-39 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
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when the board is legally unable to act in a manner conclusive upon
the corporation. If a quorum of disinterested directors is present to
act upon the contract and, without counting the votes of interested
directors, had rejected it, it is difficult to see why the interested
directors should be afforded a second chance to make the contract
binding upon the corporation. This, in effect, will substitute the
judgment of the stockholders for that of the disinterested directors.
This may be justifiable if there are not enough disinterested directors to constitute a majority of a quorum. It is not justified when
the disinterested directors would be competent to act for the corporation were it not for the presence of a sufficient number of interested directors at the meeting that the act of a majority of the
disinterested directors is not the act of a majority of the total number of directors present. It would have been preferable for the statute to have treated a contract under such circumstances as voidable
as at common law, unless shown to be "fair and reasonable" pursuant to subsection (b) of the statute.
Another salutary rule would have been to require disclosure to the
board as a prerequisite to seeking stockholder ratification, particularly since such disclosure might well affect the vote of some of the
directors. It would be particularly egregious for an interested director to intentionally refrain from disclosing his interest to the other
directors and, following adoption of the contract by the board, to
then disclose his interest to the stockholders when seeking ratification pursuant to subsection (ii). In such a case, the only recourse of
the corporation is to recover damages from the director based on his
breach of his fiduciary duty or, in some cases, to seek avoidance of
the contract on other grounds." Needless to say, the right to recover
damages may be grossly inadequate to compensate the corporation,
depending upon the financial resources of the director.
E.

The Requirement of Fairness

At common law a contract in which an officer or director had an
interest was required to be fair, in addition to having satisfied requirements of disclosure and independent corporate representation
analogous to parts (i) and (ii) of subsection (a). This seems to be a
salutary policy, for it is clearly not safe to assume that simply be60. See note 8 supra.
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cause disclosure is made the board of directors will not enter into
an unfair contract. In addition to the normal risk that a board of
directors may simply do a poor job of evaluating a contract, there
is a substantial risk that the board of directors will be more obliging
and less critical in their scrutiny of a contract with a fellow director.
A literal reading of subsection (a) would indicate that a contract
involving a conflict of interest which had been approved under either of parts (i) or (ii) of subsection (a) would be enforceable against
the corporation even if it was unfair. This view is supported by the
fact that "fairness" is set forth in section (b) of the staute as a
separate and independent ground for upholding such a contract.
Nevertheless, faced with unfair contracts approved under the
terms of a California statute nearly identical to § 13.1-39.1, the
California courts have consistently imposed a requirement of fairness to the corporation in addition to technical statutory compliance." Several commentators on similar statutes have consistently
taken the view that this judicially imposed requirement of fairness
was appropriate and should be applied under other similar statutes." Normally a court, in interpreting a statute similar to that of
another jurisdiction, will consider as persuasive the case law of that
other jurisdiction. Hopefully the California approach will be followed in Virginia.63 Such a judicially imposed requirement would
presumably look to the concept of fairness established by prior case
law, which relates to the actual fairness of the transaction at the
time at which it was entered into. Clearly, the adoption of a contract
which the directors, in the exercise of due care, should have known
was unfair is a breach of the duty owed by those directors to the
61. Efron v. Kalmanovitz, 226 Cal. App. 2d 546, 38 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1964); Remillard Brick
Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66 (1952).
62. C. Israels, CoRPoRAra PRicicE 135 (1963); Hornstein, Analysis of Business Corporation
Law, app. 1, N.Y. Bus. CoRP.LAw 441, 469 (McKinney 1963); Note, The "Unfair"Interested
Directors' Contract Under The New York Business CorporationLaw, 16 BuFFALO L. REV.840
(1967).
63. Address by Prof. Hetherington, Virginia State Bar Annual Meeting, June 22, 1974;
letter from Prof. Dooley to the author, January 7, 1974, stating that the intention under
section 13.1-39.1 is that a contract with an interested director in all cases be voidable on the
ground of unfairness, with compliance with the statutory procedures merely shifting the
burden of proof on the question of fairness. But see Comments on Proposed Amendments,
supra note 6, at 39.1-2, indicating that an unfair contract approved pursuant to the literal
terms of the Virginia statute might be sustained.
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corporation, and avoidance of such contracts is the only adequate
remedy available to the corporation.
Regardless of the existence of any superimposed requirement of
fairness, the Virginia statute on conflicts of interest specifically provides that fairness alone will validate a contract, without having to
obtain the consent of either the stockholders or the disinterested
directors, Subsection (b) of § 13.1-39.111 provides that a contract in
which an officer or director has an interest will not be voidable if
"fair and reasonable" to the corporation. This approach is in keep-

ing with common law developments in many states.65 It was specifically inserted by the drafters of the legislation, who felt that "fairness" as a separate ground for affirmance was necessary to validate
beneficial contracts in which there has been an inadvertent failure
to recognize or disclose a conflict of interest."
Subsection (b) states that fairness alone is sufficient to prevent
avoidance of contracts involving conflicts of interest. It makes no
distinction between cases in which the approval of the disinterested
directors or the stockholders was intentionally not sought and those
cases in which it was omitted through oversight. It would literally
validate even a contract which the disinterested directors and the
stockholders had refused to validate, if a court could be convinced
that the terms of the contract fell within the broad spectrum which
could be classified as "fair and reasonable". 7
64. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-39.1(b) (effective June 1, 1975) provides:
In any event no contract or other transaction described in subsection (a) of this section
shall be void or voidable despite failure to comply with parts (i) or (ii) of subsection
(a), provided that such contract or transaction was fair and reasonable to the corporation in view of all the facts known to any officer or director at the time such contract
or transaction was entered into on behalf of the corporation. In an action to obtain
relief for the corporation on account of a contract or other transaction described in
subsection (a) in which there was no compliance with parts (i) or (ii) of subsection (a)
such contract or transaction may be avoided for the benefit of the corporation and the
court may grant other appropriate relief unless the party seeking to uphold the contract
or transaction sustains the burden of proving that such contract or transaction complied with the requirement of the first sentence of this subsection (b).
65. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
66. Letter from Prof. Dooley to the author, January 7, 1974. But see Hetherington, Trends
in Legislation for Close Corporations:A Comparisonof the Wisconsin Business Corporation
Law of 1951 and the New York Business CorporationLaw of 1961, 1963 Wis. L. Rav. 92, 150
[hereinafter cited as Trends in Legislation], for view that there is no legitimate reason for
the failure of a fiduciary to disclose his interest.
67. See Trends in Legislation,supra note 66, at 149-51, discussing this problem in connec-
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The requirement that a contract be fair and reasonable to the
corporation does prevent the corporation from being substantially
harmed by the contract. However, a corporation is entitled to have
not only a fair contract, but the best bargain which its agents can
negotiate. A contract can easily fall within the broad range of contracts which can be called fair and yet be far short of the best
contract terms available. 8 Such a result would be particularly reprehensible when the officer or director having the conflict actively
participates in contract negotiations which result in terms more
beneficial to the other party than were necessary to reach agreement. The corporation is entitled to be represented by an advocate
rather than a mediator, or at least to be warned that it is not so
represented. Unless the actions of the interested officer or director
provide other grounds for rescission, the only recourse of the corporation would be against the officer or director personally to recover
the difference between what was obtained and what could have been
obtained by an agent unhampered by a conflict of interest. In such
a suit, unfortunately, it may be impossible to determine what contractual terms could have been obtained.
There are some interpretive problems relating to the test of fairness set forth in subsection (b). The test calls for fairness and reasonableness "in view of all of the facts known to any officer or
director" at the time the contract was entered into." Clearly this
standard would invalidate a contract which any single officer or
director, including the officer or director having a conflict of interest, knew to be unfair. It is less clear whether the statute would
invalidate a contract if one director knew undisclosed facts which,
had they been disclosed, would have caused a second director to
realize, in view of facts known only to that second director, that the
contract was unfair. A literal reading of "any officer or director"
might invalidate a contract only if a single person has knowledge of
sufficient facts to show that the contract is unfair or unreasonable,
and would validate a contract for which reference must be made to
the knowledge of more than one director to show the contract to be
unfair. The thought of looking to the knowledge of a single director,
tion with N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 713 (McKinney 1962).
68. Id.; Marsh, supra note 1, at 49.
69. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-39.1(b) (effective June 1, 1975).
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much less a single officer, is contrary to the concept of the board of
directors as a deliberative body." A review of the aggregate facts
known to the entire board seems more reasonably in keeping with
general corporate principles, and is clearly the more desirable interpretation of the language of the statute. Such an interpretation is
supported by the duty of each director and officer to disclose such
negative information as he has in his possession to the board, so that
all of such facts should have been available to the board. Suffice it
to point out, however, that the failure of the director to mention
such information may have been completely innocent in that his
information alone may not have been harmful, even though if it had
been combined with undisclosed information held by others it would
have led to the discovery of the unfairness of the contract.'
The reference to "any officer and director" should include directors who were not present at the adoption of the contract. If reference to the facts known to such directors were not available to defeat
a defense of a contract based on subsection (b), the intent of the
statute could be subverted by an interested director intentionally
staying away from the board meeting. The justification for including facts known to all officers is less direct, but serves the same
general prophylactic function. The corporation is entitled to disclosure of information known by its officers, and should not be penalized by the failure of an officer to perform his duty.
The operation of subsection (b) does not depend upon the actual
disclosure of adverse facts to the board of directors. Nor does it
matter whether any officer or director actually believed the contract
to be unfair. Subsection (b) simply states that the facts upon which
a court must make a decision as to the fairness and reasonableness
of the contract are limited to the facts within the knowledge of the
officers and directors at the time that the contract was adopted.
This is at least a slight relaxation of the common law, which would
have allowed a review of all facts concerning the contract, including
facts not available to the corporation, to determine whether it was
71
fair at the time of its adoption.
The statute does retain the common law rule placing the burden
70. 2 FLarcHER, supra note 12, § 392.
71. Deford v. Ballentine Realty Corp., 164 Va. 436, 180 S.E. 164 (1935); 3 FLrcHER, supra
note 12, § 919.
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of proving the fairness of the contract under subsection (b) on the
officer or director having the conflict of interest. 72 It would not seem
appropriate to draw the correlative inference that the burden of
proving unfairness shifts to the corporation when it attacks a contract approved pursuant to subsection (a). In the absence of an
express change, the burden of proof should presumably remain with
the interested officer or director.
Ill.

CONCLUSION

One positive result of the adoption of § 13.1-39.1 is the creation,
under most circumstances, of certainty as to the status of contracts
involving conflicts of interest. While the requirements of the statute
are unclear or ambiguous in certain respects, in practice there
should be relatively few situations which require clarification of
these requirements for their resolution. Certainly the statute has
removed several questions which existed at common law. It provides
a procedure whereby officers and directors can enter into contracts
beneficial to the 'corporation with a substantial degree of safety.
Assuming that the Virginia courts will continue to require an officer
or director to be fair in his dealings with a corporation, and to void
contracts which are not fair,' the procedures outline in subsection
(a) of the statute should provide adequate protection to a corporation in most cases.
The statute does not deal with several problem areas related to
contracts involving conflicts of interest, including related contract
defenses such as fraud and undue influence. Unfortunately, the
exact scope of these defenses is not very well defined in the corporate
context because most cases involving them relate to contracts which
were previously subject to avoidance because they also involved a
conflict of interest with a director or officer. 4 Now that such conflicts of interest will not be available as a separate ground for avoidance of many such contracts, the parameters of fraud and undue
influence will have to be more clearly defined in this context by the
courts.
72. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
73. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
74. See, e.g., 13 WLSTON ON CONTRACTS § 1625A at 793-95 (3d ed. 1970).
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The statute most radically departs from its common law antecedents by validating contracts involving conflicts of interest solely on
the ground that the contract is fair and reasonable to the corporation. While this position has been taken elsewhere,75 it has never
before been the law in Virginia. The Virginia Supreme Court has
repeatedly insisted upon disclosure of adverse interests as an additional condition to holding such contracts enforceable."
This departure from the common law is not altogether desirable.
Little is gained by the statute's abrogation of the common law requirement of disclosing personal interests. The cases in which an
officer or director has a material interest in a contract and fails to
realize it should be sufficiently rare as not to warrant protection. If
a board member intentionally keeps his interest a secret from the
board, the common law rule which would have let the corporation
void the contract does not appear harsh.
It is only through the disclosure of such interests that the corporation is in a position to adequately protect itself by having agents of
undivided loyalty act on its behalf. Only through representation by
such agents is the corporation likely to arrive at contract terms most
favorable to it. If the corporation receives anything less, even though
fair, it has been cheated, and it will, in most instances, have no
adequate remedy.
75. See note 4 supra and accompanying text. See also Trends in Legislation, supra note
66, at 149-51, for a persuasive attack on the adequacy of "fairness" as an independent ground
for upholding contracts.
76. Kessler v. Commonwealth Doctors Hosp., 212 Va. 497, 185 S.E.2d 43 (1971); Rowland
v. Kable, 174 Va. 343, 6 S.E.2d 633 (1940).

